

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

25 June 2019

Ms. Emma Best
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 57253
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Reference: F-2018-02021

Dear Ms. Best:

This is a final response to your 6 July 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for **records relating to or mentioning the attempted June 23, 1980 coup in Jamaica, including but not limited to reactions and response to allegations of the Agency's involvement.** We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located the enclosed five documents, consisting of 19 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and NR Record. "Not Responsive Record" is used for sections that do not mention the topic you requested. Copies of the documents and an explanation of exemptions are enclosed.

Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Information and Privacy Coordinator
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:


703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS
College Park, MD 20740-6001
202-741-5770
877-864-6448
202-741-5769 (fax)
ogis@nara.gov

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mark Lilly' with a stylized flourish at the end.

Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Explanation of Exemptions Under the Freedom of Information Act

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source ; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

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Intelligence Information Cable

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CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

(b)(3)

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REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

(b)(3)

CITE

DIST 11 MAR 80

COUNTRY: JAMAICA

SUBJECT: INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT BY

THE JAMAICA DEFENSE FORCE ON OR ABOUT 12 MARCH 1980

SOURCE:

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

1. THE RULING PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY (PNP) GENERAL SECRETARY AND MARXIST, D.K. D U N C A N, SAID THAT UNKNOWN ELEMENTS OF THE JAMAICA DEFENSE FORCE (JDF) ARE PLANNING A COUP D'ETAT ON OR ABOUT 12 MARCH 1980 BECAUSE OF THEIR INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF CONDITIONS IN JAMAICA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS NOT ABLE TO PREVENT CONTINUED ECONOMIC DECLINE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE INCREASE OF VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA.

2. ACCORDING TO DUNCAN, JDF PERSONNEL ARE NOW PROBING THE JAMAICA CONSTABULARY FORCE (JCF) TO ASSESS AND DETERMINE IF THE JCF WOULD OPPOSE A COUP ATTEMPT. DUNCAN SAYS THAT

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WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION JAMAICA LABOR PARTY (JLP) FOLLOWING IN THE JDF AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ANTI-MANLEY SYMPATHIZERS THROUGHOUT THE JCF. THESE GROUPS PROBABLY WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH A COUP ATTEMPT.

3. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE JDF IS CONSIDERING 12 MARCH FOR A COUP ATTEMPT BECAUSE PRIME MINISTER MICHAEL M A N L E Y IS PLANNING TO DEPART KINGSTON, JAMAICA AT 0900 HOURS ON 12 MARCH FOR CURACAO AND THEN ON TO GRENADA. MANLEY'S LATEST PLANS ARE TO RETURN TO JAMAICA IN THE EVENING OF 13 MARCH AND SEND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER P.J. P A T T E R S O N TO BARBADOS. MANLEY MAY BE COMING BACK EARLY BECAUSE OF THE UNSETTLED IMF ISSUE PRESENTLY BEING DEBATED OR BECAUSE OF MANLEY'S INCREASING PARANOIA OVER SECURITY CONDITIONS.)

4. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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DATE 08 OCT 80

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(b)(1)

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

WARNING NOTICE
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DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY THE ORIGINATOR

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~--NNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

COUNTRY: JAMAICA

SUBJECT: INDICATION THAT THE WORKER'S PARTY OF
JAMAICA (WPJ) PLANS TO PHYSICALLY
ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY ON
30 OCTOBER 1980.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

SOURCE:

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

1. THE WORKER'S PARTY OF JAMAICA (WPJ) WHICH HAS
SEVERAL COVER ORGANIZATIONS AND AFFILIATES THROUGHOUT JAMAICA,
IS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING METHODS AS TO HOW THEY SHOULD MOUNT
AN ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 30 OCTOBER 1980,
THE DAY OF THE JAMAICAN ELECTIONS.

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WARNING NOTICE
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CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2. THE WPJ PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE ANTI-CIA PROPAGANDA IN LATE OCTOBER TO INTENSIFY THE ANTI-CIA AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD CULMINATE IN THE ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY. THE WPJ WOULD FIRST DISTRIBUTE POSTERS THAT LIST THE "CIA DESTABILIZATION TEAM IN JAMAICA" AND THE "CIA PERSONNEL IN JAMAICA 1976-1979", AND PROVIDE ACCURATE BIOGRAPHIC DATA, HOME ADDRESSES IN JAMAICA AND OTHER INFORMATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES ALL PERSONS NAMED. TO SUPPORT THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THE WPJ WILL ENCOURAGE THE JAMAICA BROADCASTING CORPORATION TO TELEVISION FILMS THAT WOULD PORTRAY THE CIA BEING INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE POSTERS WHICH THE WPJ PLANS TO REDISTRIBUTE ARE THE SAME AS THE ONE WHICH WERE PRINTED, PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED BY "THE PAUL BOGLE LIBERATION MOVEMENT," A PNP COVER ORGANIZATION. IN JULY 1980. [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED]

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**WARNING NOTICE
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OPERATIONS

(b)(3)

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

(b)(3)

CITE [REDACTED]
DIST 21 OCT 80(b)(1)
(b)(3)

COUNTRY:

JAMAICA [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

JAMAICA DEFENSE

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

FORCE PLANS COUP [REDACTED]

SOURCE:

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(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

1. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

THE PNP WILL WIN

THE 30 OCTOBER 1980 ELECTIONS. BECAUSE PRIME MINISTER
MICHAEL M A N L E Y DOES NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE
JAMAICA DEFENSE FORCE (JDF), THE JDF WILL STAGE A COUP D'
ETAT FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS TO PRESENT THE PNP
FROM TAKING OFFICE. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
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THE BACKING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA SHOULD THE JDF
ATTEMPT A COUP TO PREVENT THE PNP FROM TAKING POWER. [REDACTED]


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
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
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(b)(3)

THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN BY THE GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED AND LEFTIST DOMINATED MEDIA DURING RECENT WEEKS
TO DISCREDIT THE SECURITY FORCES AND TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE
THE GENERAL PUBLIC THAT THE ARMY (JDF) AND POLICE ARE ANTI-
GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE ANOMOLY OF THE GOVERN-
MENT ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT AND HAMPER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
ITS OWN SECURITY FORCES.

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

~~Secret~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~

Latin America Review

27 June 1960

~~Secret~~

PA LAR 00-016
27 June 1960

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~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~**Jamaica: Opposition Gaining for Fall Election (U)****Summary**

The moderate opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) is increasing its seemingly unassailable lead over Prime Minister Manley's People's National Party (PNP), despite efforts by PNP leftists to promote a US "destabilization" campaign and to provoke political violence. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the JLP will win the election, that Manley will have little choice but to step down, and that covert assistance from Cuba probably will cushion but not prevent his downfall. Manley--in contrast to his actions in the 1976 election--apparently is not fully backing the radicals' strategy.

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JLP Fortunes

The JLP's strong position has improved in recent months, despite a surge of urban violence. Reliable polls show an increase in the JLP's lead from 12 percent to 15 percent between November and May. A widely respected pollster, who has accurately predicted Jamaican elections since 1972, stated in March that the JLP probably would secure 44 to 48 of the 60 seats in Parliament if the contest is basically fair. (U)

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Fundamental political and economic instability on the island precludes a sanguine prediction of election results. Trends favorable to the JLP appear to be increasing, however, as party leader Edward Seaga

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27 June 1980

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Manley, who made an early rousing defense of Thompson, apparently is now caving in to strong pressure from the JLP and a host of Jamaica's most influential professional groups. The Prime Minister [redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted] intends to replace his increasingly controversial security minister. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Alleged Rightist Coup

Publicity following the recent arrest of 27 alleged rightist coup plotters will provoke some local sympathy for Manley, but it is unlikely to improve his poor chances for reelection or to provide a pretext for increased security measures against the JLP. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Seaga has compounded local rumors by charging that the PNP either fabricated or exaggerated the conspiracy to justify a state of emergency. These rumors could have some basis in fact, as additional security measures would increase Manley's leverage against the opposition. [redacted]

(b)(3)

On the other hand, the largely anti-Manley Army evidently took the lead in the investigation of an incipient and seemingly foredoomed conspiracy mainly concentrated within its own ranks. The accused include three junior Army officers and 23 noncommissioned officers led by a virtually unknown political rightist. Whatever its origins, however, the coup scare is having little impact on the growing fortunes of the JLP. [redacted]

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27 June 1980

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Local rumor persists that Manley, with Cuba's help, will forestall or fix the election by inciting violence that will lead to a state of emergency and to his entrenchment in power. The attempt to escalate violence undoubtedly will continue to be an important element in the PNP's campaign to stop the JLP, as well as the principal threat to a fair election. Cuban-trained thugs, moreover, might help PNP radicals forcibly to hold some constituencies in an opposition sweep. That any PNP strategy can successfully prevent the advent of a Seaga government, however, appears increasingly doubtful.

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27 June 1980

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Director of
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Intelligence



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National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday
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JAMAICA: Alleged Rightist Coup Plot

Publicity following the arrest last Sunday of 27 alleged rightist coup plotters will provoke some local sympathy for Prime Minister Manley, but it is unlikely to improve his poor chances for reelection or to provide a pretext for increased security measures against the moderate opposition.

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Manley apparently has refused to join local radicals in exploiting the incident as part of an alleged US "de-stabilization" campaign.

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Seaga has compounded local rumors by charging that the ruling party either fabricated or exaggerated the conspiracy to justify a state of emergency. These rumors could have some basis in fact as additional security measures would increase Manley's leverage against the opposition.

(b)(3)

On the other hand, the largely anti-Manley Army evidently took the lead in the investigation of an incipient and seemingly foredoomed conspiracy mainly concentrated within its own ranks. The accused include three junior Army officers and 23 noncommissioned officers led by a virtually unknown political rightist. Whatever its origins, however, the coup scare is having little impact on the growing fortunes of an opposition party strongly favored to defeat Manley this fall.

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TCS 2849/80
25 June 1980